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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:20:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99709 — inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99709</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by
the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.
If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc
adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own
reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,
raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep
a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse
a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill
the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of
legitimate traffic.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet: frags: limit the truesize of a reassembly queue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The truesize of fragments in a reassembly queue is only bounded by
the per netns ipfrag_high_thresh sysctl, which has no upper limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;inet_frag_reasm_finish() sums the truesize of all fragments in an int.
If this sum reaches 2^32, it wraps, and the final sk_wmem_alloc
adjustment of the socket owning the reassembled skb can cancel its own
reference, leading to a use-after-free of this socket.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This can be triggered from an unprivileged user/network namespace,
raising ipfrag_high_thresh and using padded TUN packets, which keep
a large truesize after being trimmed by ip_rcv_core().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Track the sum of the truesize of fragments in each queue, and refuse
a fragment that would make it bigger than INT_MAX / 2. Callers kill
the queue on this error. This bound is far above the needs of
legitimate traffic.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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