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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:20:33 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-99396 — xfs: bound da-node entry count against the correct geometry</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99396</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: bound da-node entry count against the correct geometry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs_da3_node_verify() bounds the node entry count against the larger of
the directory and attribute geometries because, as a buffer verifier, it
cannot tell whether the block belongs to the directory or the attribute
tree. When the directory block size exceeds the fs block size (e.g.
mkfs.xfs -n size=64k -b size=4k), an attribute node buffer is a single fs
block that holds only m_attr_geo-&amp;gt;node_ents entries, yet a crafted attr
node may claim a count up to m_dir_geo-&amp;gt;node_ents and still pass the
verifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs_da3_node_lookup_int() then indexes btree[] up to that count during
its binary search -- an out-of-bounds read via getxattr/listxattr on a
mounted crafted image.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer verifier is the wrong place to tighten this: it has no fork
context, and the transaction-less read path used by getxattr does not run
xfs_da3_node_set_type() either. xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(), on the other
hand, always runs on that path and holds args-&amp;gt;geo, the geometry of the
fork actually being searched. Bound the entry count against
args-&amp;gt;geo-&amp;gt;node_ents there, before walking the entries.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: bound da-node entry count against the correct geometry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs_da3_node_verify() bounds the node entry count against the larger of
the directory and attribute geometries because, as a buffer verifier, it
cannot tell whether the block belongs to the directory or the attribute
tree. When the directory block size exceeds the fs block size (e.g.
mkfs.xfs -n size=64k -b size=4k), an attribute node buffer is a single fs
block that holds only m_attr_geo-&amp;gt;node_ents entries, yet a crafted attr
node may claim a count up to m_dir_geo-&amp;gt;node_ents and still pass the
verifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs_da3_node_lookup_int() then indexes btree[] up to that count during
its binary search -- an out-of-bounds read via getxattr/listxattr on a
mounted crafted image.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The buffer verifier is the wrong place to tighten this: it has no fork
context, and the transaction-less read path used by getxattr does not run
xfs_da3_node_set_type() either. xfs_da3_node_lookup_int(), on the other
hand, always runs on that path and holds args-&amp;gt;geo, the geometry of the
fork actually being searched. Bound the entry count against
args-&amp;gt;geo-&amp;gt;node_ents there, before walking the entries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-99396</guid>
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