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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 13:22:06 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98728 — tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98728</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the response carries the TPM2_ST_SESSIONS tag, tpm2_get_random()
skips the 4-byte parameter size field before locating the random data,
but the bounds check still validates the response length against
TPM_HEADER_SIZE.  A truncated response can pass the check and make
memcpy() read up to 4 bytes past the response end, so stale buffer
contents end up in the caller&amp;#39;s random bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by checking the response length against &amp;#39;offset&amp;#39;, which
already includes the skipped parameter size field.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tpm: fix off-by-four bounds check in tpm2_get_random()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the response carries the TPM2_ST_SESSIONS tag, tpm2_get_random()
skips the 4-byte parameter size field before locating the random data,
but the bounds check still validates the response length against
TPM_HEADER_SIZE.  A truncated response can pass the check and make
memcpy() read up to 4 bytes past the response end, so stale buffer
contents end up in the caller&amp;#39;s random bytes.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix this by checking the response length against &amp;#39;offset&amp;#39;, which
already includes the skipped parameter size field.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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