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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 02 Nov 2026 23:11:41 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98687 — thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98687</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its
252-byte response buffer.  The XDomain length field is six bits wide,
however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63.  After the fixed response
fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 322e93448d90 (&amp;#34;thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to
allocation size&amp;#34;) only bounds the copy against data_len.  If data_len is
at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res-&amp;gt;data array,
causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read.  Commit 4db2bd2ed478
(&amp;#34;thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size&amp;#34;) limits
the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer
before copying them into the assembled property block.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;thunderbolt: Reject oversized XDomain properties responses&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its
252-byte response buffer.  The XDomain length field is six bits wide,
however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63.  After the fixed response
fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit 322e93448d90 (&amp;#34;thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to
allocation size&amp;#34;) only bounds the copy against data_len.  If data_len is
at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res-&amp;gt;data array,
causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read.  Commit 4db2bd2ed478
(&amp;#34;thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size&amp;#34;) limits
the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer
before copying them into the assembled property block.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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