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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 18:43:39 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98520 — drm/amdkfd: fix use-after-free and multi-container gap in kfd_dev_mapping</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98520</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amdkfd: fix use-after-free and multi-container gap in kfd_dev_mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kfd_dev_mapping caches the address_space of the first /dev/kfd opener
so that the GPU reset path can call unmap_mapping_range() to zap all
userspace mappings of doorbell and MMIO ranges.  This design has two
bugs that both manifest under SRIOV with multiple containers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Use-after-free / rwsem deadlock.  The cached pointer refers to an
   inode owned by the first opener&amp;#39;s container.  When that container
   exits and its inode is released, kfd_dev_mapping becomes a dangling
   pointer.  A subsequent GPU reset dereferences it inside
   unmap_mapping_range(), which takes i_mmap_rwsem on the freed inode,
   causing a hard hang observable as an uninterruptible rwsem wait.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Multi-container gap.  Only the first opener&amp;#39;s address_space is cached;
   VMAs created by later openers live in a different address_space and
   are never reached by unmap_mapping_range().  After a GPU reset those
   stale mappings keep doorbell and MMIO pages accessible to guest
   userspace with no GPU behind them, risking PCIe transaction timeouts
   and NMI panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both bugs with the same approach used by DRM core (drm_drv.c):
create a private pseudo-filesystem at module init time and allocate one
anonymous inode from it.  In kfd_open() redirect every opener&amp;#39;s
file-&amp;gt;f_mapping to that inode&amp;#39;s address_space.  The inode is
module-owned, lives exactly as long…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;drm/amdkfd: fix use-after-free and multi-container gap in kfd_dev_mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kfd_dev_mapping caches the address_space of the first /dev/kfd opener
so that the GPU reset path can call unmap_mapping_range() to zap all
userspace mappings of doorbell and MMIO ranges.  This design has two
bugs that both manifest under SRIOV with multiple containers:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1. Use-after-free / rwsem deadlock.  The cached pointer refers to an
   inode owned by the first opener&amp;#39;s container.  When that container
   exits and its inode is released, kfd_dev_mapping becomes a dangling
   pointer.  A subsequent GPU reset dereferences it inside
   unmap_mapping_range(), which takes i_mmap_rwsem on the freed inode,
   causing a hard hang observable as an uninterruptible rwsem wait.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2. Multi-container gap.  Only the first opener&amp;#39;s address_space is cached;
   VMAs created by later openers live in a different address_space and
   are never reached by unmap_mapping_range().  After a GPU reset those
   stale mappings keep doorbell and MMIO pages accessible to guest
   userspace with no GPU behind them, risking PCIe transaction timeouts
   and NMI panics.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix both bugs with the same approach used by DRM core (drm_drv.c):
create a private pseudo-filesystem at module init time and allocate one
anonymous inode from it.  In kfd_open() redirect every opener&amp;#39;s
file-&amp;gt;f_mapping to that inode&amp;#39;s address_space.  The inode is
module-owned, lives exactly as long…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98520</guid>
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