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    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98273 — x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98273</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+249&amp;gt;:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+254&amp;gt;:  mov    %r14,%rdi
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+257&amp;gt;:  cs call &amp;lt;__x86_indirect_thunk_r12&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+263&amp;gt;:  mov    %eax,%r12d
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+266&amp;gt;:  xchg   %ax,%ax
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+268&amp;gt;:  mov    %r13,%rdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which triggers this crash:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occup…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function,
a crash can be triggered.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues()
function:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+249&amp;gt;:  nopl   0x0(%rax,%rax,1)
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+254&amp;gt;:  mov    %r14,%rdi
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+257&amp;gt;:  cs call &amp;lt;__x86_indirect_thunk_r12&amp;gt;
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+263&amp;gt;:  mov    %eax,%r12d
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+266&amp;gt;:  xchg   %ax,%ax
&amp;lt;__hrtimer_run_queues+268&amp;gt;:  mov    %r13,%rdi&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Which triggers this crash:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI
  CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P
  RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is
at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL
instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that
call instruction.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a
function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction,
int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes
long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occup…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98273</guid>
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