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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 18:40:20 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-98236 — net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98236</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mhi_mbim_rx() ignores the return value of skb_copy_bits() when it
copies each datagram out of the NTB.  The datagram offset and length
come from the DPE, which is only checked to lie within the NTB
itself, so a modem can point a datagram outside the received skb.
The copy then fails and the freshly allocated skbn is passed to
netif_rx() with its uninitialized contents still in place, leaking
kernel heap memory into the network stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the skb and account an error when the copy fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector pointing a DPE
outside the received NTB: the copy fails, and the unpatched driver
hands the uninitialized skbn to the network stack (observed as
&amp;#34;unknown protocol&amp;#34; on bytes that were never written).  With this
check the failed datagram is dropped and counted as an rx error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Changes in v2: factor the free-and-count sequence out into
mhi_mbim_rx_drop(), shared with the unknown-protocol path, as
suggested by Loic Poulain.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mhi_mbim_rx() ignores the return value of skb_copy_bits() when it
copies each datagram out of the NTB.  The datagram offset and length
come from the DPE, which is only checked to lie within the NTB
itself, so a modem can point a datagram outside the received skb.
The copy then fails and the freshly allocated skbn is passed to
netif_rx() with its uninitialized contents still in place, leaking
kernel heap memory into the network stack.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the skb and account an error when the copy fails.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector pointing a DPE
outside the received NTB: the copy fails, and the unpatched driver
hands the uninitialized skbn to the network stack (observed as
&amp;#34;unknown protocol&amp;#34; on bytes that were never written).  With this
check the failed datagram is dropped and counted as an rx error.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Changes in v2: factor the free-and-count sequence out into
mhi_mbim_rx_drop(), shared with the unknown-protocol path, as
suggested by Loic Poulain.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98236</guid>
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