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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 12 Oct 2026 17:04:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-98171 — smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98171</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()&amp;#39;s handling of compound encrypted frames:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server-&amp;gt;bigbuf. A stale
  next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
  error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
  the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
  ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
- Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying
  pdu_length - next_cmd &amp;lt; MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the
  trailing slice is large enough for a header.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()&amp;#39;s handling of compound encrypted frames:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server-&amp;gt;bigbuf. A stale
  next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
  error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
  the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
  ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
- Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying
  pdu_length - next_cmd &amp;lt; MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the
  trailing slice is large enough for a header.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-98171</guid>
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