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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Mon, 28 Sep 2026 15:11:21 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-95698 — MISP Path Traversal in OrgImgHelper findOrgImage via Crafted Organization Name</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95698</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The findOrgImage method in MISP&amp;#39;s OrgImgHelper constructs a filesystem path by concatenating a user-supplied organization identifier with a fixed image directory and a file extension, then calls file_exists() on the resulting path. The organization name field is attacker-controllable through event import, which sets Org.name. Because no validation was performed on the field value before path construction, an organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) would cause the path to resolve outside the intended org-image directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This yields two security impacts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- an arbitrary file existence oracle, since file_exists() returns a boolean for any path the process can access.
 - an arbitrary file read limited to files with .png or .svg extensions, because the resolved filename is returned and subsequently rendered or served to the requesting user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to create or import events that set the organization name.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The findOrgImage method in MISP&amp;#39;s OrgImgHelper constructs a filesystem path by concatenating a user-supplied organization identifier with a fixed image directory and a file extension, then calls file_exists() on the resulting path. The organization name field is attacker-controllable through event import, which sets Org.name. Because no validation was performed on the field value before path construction, an organization name containing directory traversal sequences (e.g., ../../etc/passwd) would cause the path to resolve outside the intended org-image directory.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This yields two security impacts:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;- an arbitrary file existence oracle, since file_exists() returns a boolean for any path the process can access.
 - an arbitrary file read limited to files with .png or .svg extensions, because the resolved filename is returned and subsequently rendered or served to the requesting user.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The vulnerability requires an authenticated user with the ability to create or import events that set the organization name.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-95698</guid>
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