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      <title>CVE-2026-94109 — openEQUELLA &lt; 2026.1.0 Authenticated Stored SSTI via FreemarkerPortletRenderer</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-94109</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEQUELLA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openEQUELLA before 2026.1.0 contains an authenticated stored server-side template injection vulnerability in FreemarkerPortletRenderer.renderHtml() that allows any authenticated non-guest user to achieve remote code execution by storing a malicious FreeMarker payload through a POST request to the RemotePortletService invoker endpoint. The markup field from stored portlet configuration is passed directly to custFactory.createResult() without a TemplateClassResolver restriction or FreeMarker sandboxing in BasicConfiguration, leaving built-ins such as ?new and freemarker.template.utility.Execute available, causing the payload to execute in the application server process context when any user renders a dashboard containing the affected portlet.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; openEQUELLA&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;openEQUELLA before 2026.1.0 contains an authenticated stored server-side template injection vulnerability in FreemarkerPortletRenderer.renderHtml() that allows any authenticated non-guest user to achieve remote code execution by storing a malicious FreeMarker payload through a POST request to the RemotePortletService invoker endpoint. The markup field from stored portlet configuration is passed directly to custFactory.createResult() without a TemplateClassResolver restriction or FreeMarker sandboxing in BasicConfiguration, leaving built-ins such as ?new and freemarker.template.utility.Execute available, causing the payload to execute in the application server process context when any user renders a dashboard containing the affected portlet.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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