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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 03:58:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-93603 — vm2 before 3.12.1 Sandbox Escape RCE via Non-Strict Host Function</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-93603</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; patriksimek vm2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&amp;#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; patriksimek vm2&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;vm2 through 3.12.0 (fixed in 3.12.1) does not correctly handle a nullish `this` receiver in the apply trap of its bridge (lib/bridge.js): when sandboxed code calls a host-provided non-strict (sloppy-mode) function without a receiver — e.g. `fn()`, a detached method, `fn.call()`, `fn.apply(undefined)`, `Reflect.apply(fn, undefined, [])`, or `fn.bind()()` — the undefined receiver is passed straight through to the host call, and V8 substitutes the host realm&amp;#39;s global object for `this`. vm2 then wraps and returns that object to the sandbox, giving sandboxed script a live proxy of the host global. This allows a complete sandbox escape: untrusted script can reach `process` and execute arbitrary code/commands on the host (for example via `process.getBuiltinModule(&amp;#39;child_process&amp;#39;).execSync`). Exploitation requires that the embedding application expose at least one non-strict host function to the sandbox; strict-mode and ES module host functions are not affected.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-93603</guid>
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