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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Wed, 30 Sep 2026 19:00:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-93095 — hfsplus: validate thread record before delete key rebuild</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-93095</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hfsplus: validate thread record before delete key rebuild&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hfsplus_delete_cat() is called with str == NULL when the last open
reference to an unlinked HFS+ hardlink backing inode is closed. In that
case, the function finds the catalog thread by CNID and rebuilds the
catalog key from thread.nodeName.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That reconstruction path reads thread.nodeName.length directly from the
catalog B-tree into fd.search_key and then copies length * 2 bytes into
fd.search_key-&amp;gt;cat.name.unicode. It does not first check that the found
record is a thread record or that its size matches the thread name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A corrupted image can therefore provide an oversized thread name length
and make hfs_bnode_read() write past the catalog search-key allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read the CNID record through hfsplus_brec_read_cat(), which bounds the
record read to sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry) and verifies that a thread
record&amp;#39;s size exactly matches nodeName.length. Together, these checks
ensure an accepted thread name fits HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Reject non-thread
records before building the delete key from the validated thread name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Share the thread-record-type helper between hfsplus_find_cat() and
hfsplus_delete_cat().&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Linux&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hfsplus: validate thread record before delete key rebuild&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;hfsplus_delete_cat() is called with str == NULL when the last open
reference to an unlinked HFS+ hardlink backing inode is closed. In that
case, the function finds the catalog thread by CNID and rebuilds the
catalog key from thread.nodeName.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That reconstruction path reads thread.nodeName.length directly from the
catalog B-tree into fd.search_key and then copies length * 2 bytes into
fd.search_key-&amp;gt;cat.name.unicode. It does not first check that the found
record is a thread record or that its size matches the thread name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A corrupted image can therefore provide an oversized thread name length
and make hfs_bnode_read() write past the catalog search-key allocation.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Read the CNID record through hfsplus_brec_read_cat(), which bounds the
record read to sizeof(hfsplus_cat_entry) and verifies that a thread
record&amp;#39;s size exactly matches nodeName.length. Together, these checks
ensure an accepted thread name fits HFSPLUS_MAX_STRLEN. Reject non-thread
records before building the delete key from the validated thread name.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Share the thread-record-type helper between hfsplus_find_cat() and
hfsplus_delete_cat().&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-93095</guid>
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