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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 19:34:38 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-90882 — Reflected arbitrary origins with credentials, allowing cross-origin reads of authenticated user data</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-90882</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation open-vsx.org&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The open-vsx.org deployment returned Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflecting the requesting origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true on the authenticated /user/ endpoints. A page on any origin could therefore issue credentialed requests to the service in a logged-in user&amp;#39;s browser and read the responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This exposed /user (login name, avatar, homepage, tokens URL), /user/tokens, /user/namespaces, /user/extensions, /user/search/{name} and /user/namespace/{name}/members, and — because /user/csrf was readable the same way — allowed the CSRF protection on write endpoints to be defeated. Chaining the two, an attacker page could call /user/token/create and exfiltrate a personal access token carrying publish and delete rights over the victim&amp;#39;s namespaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The headers were emitted by the CDN/edge layer, not by the application: the Open VSX software sets allowCredentials(true) in exactly one place, against a single exact origin derived from ovsx.webui.url, and defines no CORS mapping on /user/ beyond it. No configuration of the software produces origin reflection with credentials.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eclipse Foundation open-vsx.org&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The open-vsx.org deployment returned Access-Control-Allow-Origin reflecting the requesting origin together with Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true on the authenticated /user/ endpoints. A page on any origin could therefore issue credentialed requests to the service in a logged-in user&amp;#39;s browser and read the responses.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This exposed /user (login name, avatar, homepage, tokens URL), /user/tokens, /user/namespaces, /user/extensions, /user/search/{name} and /user/namespace/{name}/members, and — because /user/csrf was readable the same way — allowed the CSRF protection on write endpoints to be defeated. Chaining the two, an attacker page could call /user/token/create and exfiltrate a personal access token carrying publish and delete rights over the victim&amp;#39;s namespaces.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The headers were emitted by the CDN/edge layer, not by the application: the Open VSX software sets allowCredentials(true) in exactly one place, against a single exact origin derived from ovsx.webui.url, and defines no CORS mapping on /user/ beyond it. No configuration of the software produces origin reflection with credentials.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-90882</guid>
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