https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:02:48 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-87119 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ZenHive mpp</p> <p>Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.</p> <p>The payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer&#39;s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain&#39;s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.</p> <p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ZenHive mpp</p> <p>Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an attacker holding a captured subscription activation credential to charge the payer repeatedly.</p> <p>The payer signs a Tempo KeyAuthorization over the chain id, key type, key id, expiry, limits and scopes only, with nothing tying it to the challenge that prompted it. MPP.Methods.Tempo.KeyAuthorization.verify/3 in lib/mpp/methods/tempo/key_authorization.ex pins each of those signed fields against the subscription request, and the access key it pins is a static per-endpoint server key, so one signed authorization verifies against every challenge the server issues for the same subscription terms. MPP.Methods.Tempo.Subscription.activate/4 deduplicates activations by challenge id, so presenting the captured credential under a fresh challenge produces a different dedup key, claim_activation succeeds, and the subscription transaction is built and broadcast again. Each replay charges the payer&#39;s wallet a new first-period settlement and re-authorizes the server key, bounded only by the subscription expiry and the chain&#39;s own semantics for re-installing an existing key.</p> <p>This issue affects mpp: from 0.14.0 before 0.16.2.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-87119