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      <title>CVE-2026-82759 — Reversible IP address pseudonymisation in AshAuthentication audit log hash mode</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-82759</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on&amp;#39;s :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt &amp;lt;&amp;gt; ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant &amp;#34;default-salt-change-in-production&amp;#34; published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Use of a One-Way Hash with a Predictable Salt vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows readers of the audit store to recover the client IP addresses that the audit log add-on&amp;#39;s :hash privacy mode is meant to pseudonymise.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.AddOn.AuditLog.IpPrivacy.hash_ip/1 computes a single unkeyed :crypto.hash(:sha256, salt &amp;lt;&amp;gt; ip) and truncates the result to 16 hexadecimal characters. The salt is read from the :audit_log_ip_salt or :secret application config keys, and falls back to the constant &amp;#34;default-salt-change-in-production&amp;#34; published in the library source when neither is set, with nothing warning that the default is in use. The IPv4 space is only 2^32 values and SHA-256 is fast, so the whole hash table is precomputable and every stored value maps back to its source address. Truncating to 16 characters does not help, and even a configured salt leaves the hash cheap enough to enumerate once it leaks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 4.12.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-82759</guid>
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