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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2026-81638 — Non-canonical ULID spellings are accepted and alias to the same record in ash_double_entry</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-81638</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_double_entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding vulnerability in ash-project ash_double_entry allows an attacker to submit several distinct string spellings of the same identifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshDoubleEntry.ULID renders a 128-bit ULID as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character encodes only 3 bits, so canonical values are 0 to 7. decode/1 in lib/ulid.ex masks the first character to its low 3 bits and valid?/1 accepts all 32 characters in that position, so 0..., 8..., G... and R... decode to the identical 16-byte value and resolve to the same row. When the type is exposed as a public ID over an HTTP or API boundary, an attacker-supplied ID can be spelled differently from the record it actually reads or writes, desynchronizing or bypassing string-level checks such as idempotency and deduplication keys, deny-lists, audit correlation, or signatures computed over the submitted ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_double_entry: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; ash-project ash_double_entry&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Handling of Alternate Encoding vulnerability in ash-project ash_double_entry allows an attacker to submit several distinct string spellings of the same identifier.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshDoubleEntry.ULID renders a 128-bit ULID as 26 Crockford base-32 characters, but the first character encodes only 3 bits, so canonical values are 0 to 7. decode/1 in lib/ulid.ex masks the first character to its low 3 bits and valid?/1 accepts all 32 characters in that position, so 0..., 8..., G... and R... decode to the identical 16-byte value and resolve to the same row. When the type is exposed as a public ID over an HTTP or API boundary, an attacker-supplied ID can be spelled differently from the record it actually reads or writes, desynchronizing or bypassing string-level checks such as idempotency and deduplication keys, deny-lists, audit correlation, or signatures computed over the submitted ID.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_double_entry: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-81638</guid>
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