https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Wed, 30 Sep 2026 11:07:57 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-78230 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ash-project ash_ai</p> <p>AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.</p> <p>Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor&#39;s field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool&#39;s existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.</p> <p>The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource&#39;s field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.</p> <p>This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> ash-project ash_ai</p> <p>AshAi exposes Ash read actions to language-model tool calls. The read tool accepts an aggregate result type (min, max, sum, avg) that builds an ad-hoc Ash.Query.Aggregate over a named field and returns its raw value.</p> <p>Ash field policies redact forbidden fields on returned records (replacing them with %Ash.ForbiddenField{}), but that redaction does not apply to aggregate values. A tool caller could therefore read a field the calling actor&#39;s field policies forbid by requesting it as an aggregate; min/max in particular return an actual field value. This includes fields that are public? true but restricted per-actor by a field policy, such as sensitive PII. The tool&#39;s existing check only required the field to be public, which is a separate axis from per-actor field-policy authorization.</p> <p>The fix authorizes the aggregated field against the resource&#39;s field policies, so aggregating over a field the actor may not see is refused or scoped to the rows where it is visible.</p> <p>This issue affects ash_ai: from 0.1.0 before 1.0.3.</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-78230