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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 23:03:27 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-78223 — Token revocation record built from unverified JWT claims in AshAuthentication</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-78223</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3 reads the :token argument and decodes it with AshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1, which delegates to Joken.peek_claims/1 and performs no signature check, unlike Jwt.verify/4. The jti, exp and sub claims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only by byte_size(token) &amp;gt; 0. Because expires_at derives from the attacker-chosen exp, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the real jti but backdates exp yields a revocation row that is already expired: expunge_expired removes it and the genuine token passes revoked? again. Arbitrary jti and sub values can be inserted the same way.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; team-alembic ash_authentication&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in team-alembic AshAuthentication allows a caller of the token revocation action to neutralise a revocation or write arbitrary rows into the token resource.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;AshAuthentication.TokenResource.RevokeTokenChange.change/3 reads the :token argument and decodes it with AshAuthentication.Jwt.peek/1, which delegates to Joken.peek_claims/1 and performs no signature check, unlike Jwt.verify/4. The jti, exp and sub claims it returns are written straight onto the revocation record, guarded only by byte_size(token) &amp;gt; 0. Because expires_at derives from the attacker-chosen exp, a forged copy of a genuine token that keeps the real jti but backdates exp yields a revocation row that is already expired: expunge_expired removes it and the genuine token passes revoked? again. Arbitrary jti and sub values can be inserted the same way.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects ash_authentication: from 0.2.0 before 4.15.0 and from 5.0.0-rc.0 before 5.0.0-rc.14.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-78223</guid>
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