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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 06:35:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-73160 — cti-transmute Unauthenticated SSRF via Hostnames Resolving to Internal IP Addresses</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-73160</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP cti-transmute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; MISP cti-transmute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Affected versions of cti-transmute contain an SSRF vulnerability in the /fetch_misp_event and /misp_search_events endpoints.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The URL validation routine checked whether a supplied hostname was itself an IP literal and rejected private, loopback, link-local, or reserved IPs. However, ordinary domain names were accepted without resolving them first. An attacker could therefore use a hostname whose DNS record pointed to an internal address and cause the cti-transmute server to issue requests into its internal network. The commit explicitly states that anonymous callers could make the server request the internal target and read the response.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The fix resolves hostnames using socket.getaddrinfo(), checks that every resolved address is globally routable, and additionally places @login_required on both affected MISP fetch/search routes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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