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      <title>CVE-2026-62847 — Metalama: Local code execution via DLL planting in world-writable temporary directories (Linux/macOS)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-62847</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Metalama&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#. Prior to 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19, Metalama.Framework and Metalama.Tool load and execute compile-time assemblies, auxiliary executable tools and embedded helper assemblies from predictable temporary directories. On `Linux` and `macOS`, the default `Path.GetTempPath()` location is world-writable, and existing artifacts are trusted based on sentinel or `.completed` marker files rather than integrity verification. A local unprivileged user on a shared machine or CI/build agent can pre-create the deterministic directory structure and plant a malicious DLL with the matching sentinel. When a higher-privileged developer or build account subsequently builds, Metalama skips regeneration and executes the planted artifact in the compiler, IDE or MSBuild process as the building user. This permits cross-user privilege escalation, reading source and secrets, supply-chain tampering with build output, or disrupting builds. Default Windows per-user temporary directories are protected by ACLs and are not affected. Deployer-selected insecure cache locations are outside the vulnerability&amp;#39;s scope. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Metalama&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Metalama is a Roslyn-based open-source patterns and architecture toolkit for C#. Prior to 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19, Metalama.Framework and Metalama.Tool load and execute compile-time assemblies, auxiliary executable tools and embedded helper assemblies from predictable temporary directories. On `Linux` and `macOS`, the default `Path.GetTempPath()` location is world-writable, and existing artifacts are trusted based on sentinel or `.completed` marker files rather than integrity verification. A local unprivileged user on a shared machine or CI/build agent can pre-create the deterministic directory structure and plant a malicious DLL with the matching sentinel. When a higher-privileged developer or build account subsequently builds, Metalama skips regeneration and executes the planted artifact in the compiler, IDE or MSBuild process as the building user. This permits cross-user privilege escalation, reading source and secrets, supply-chain tampering with build output, or disrupting builds. Default Windows per-user temporary directories are protected by ACLs and are not affected. Deployer-selected insecure cache locations are outside the vulnerability&amp;#39;s scope. This issue is fixed in versions 2025.1.18, 2026.0.25 and 2026.1.19.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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