https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Sat, 31 Oct 2026 09:40:29 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61728 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> socfortress CoPilot</p> <p>SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected snapshots preceding the respective 0.1.70 and 0.1.76 sink repairs, portal users, including `customer_user`, can submit stored markup through `POST /api/incidents/db_operations/alert/comment`. In `customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue`, `commentHtml` replaces newlines in `comment.comment` but passes the result to `v-html` without escaping or sanitizing HTML. When another user views the poisoned alert, stored script executes on the application origin; the same unsanitized rendering pattern affects server-stored SOC case, asset and health-check fields in `SocCaseNote.vue`, `SocCaseItem.vue`, `SocCaseAssetsItem.vue`, `SocAlertAssetsItem.vue` and `HealthcheckItem.vue`. The authentication store in `customer-portal/src/stores/auth.ts` persists both access and refresh tokens in JavaScript-readable storage, and `customer-portal/src/api/httpClient.ts` uses bearer headers rather than HttpOnly cookies. An injected script can steal both tokens, impersonate the viewer and obtain fresh tokens through `/auth/refresh`. If an analyst or administrator views the poisoned alert or case, this enables persistent privileged account takeover, cross-tenant data access, incident modification or deletion, and detection/response subversion. The health-check sink repair is first contained in version 0.1.70, while the comment and other SOC sink repairs are first…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> socfortress CoPilot</p> <p>SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. In affected snapshots preceding the respective 0.1.70 and 0.1.76 sink repairs, portal users, including `customer_user`, can submit stored markup through `POST /api/incidents/db_operations/alert/comment`. In `customer-portal/src/components/alerts/AlertDetails/AlertComment.vue`, `commentHtml` replaces newlines in `comment.comment` but passes the result to `v-html` without escaping or sanitizing HTML. When another user views the poisoned alert, stored script executes on the application origin; the same unsanitized rendering pattern affects server-stored SOC case, asset and health-check fields in `SocCaseNote.vue`, `SocCaseItem.vue`, `SocCaseAssetsItem.vue`, `SocAlertAssetsItem.vue` and `HealthcheckItem.vue`. The authentication store in `customer-portal/src/stores/auth.ts` persists both access and refresh tokens in JavaScript-readable storage, and `customer-portal/src/api/httpClient.ts` uses bearer headers rather than HttpOnly cookies. An injected script can steal both tokens, impersonate the viewer and obtain fresh tokens through `/auth/refresh`. If an analyst or administrator views the poisoned alert or case, this enables persistent privileged account takeover, cross-tenant data access, incident modification or deletion, and detection/response subversion. The health-check sink repair is first contained in version 0.1.70, while the comment and other SOC sink repairs are first…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-61728