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      <title>CVE-2026-57565 — Readest: Cross-tenant object write via unsanitized fileName in /api/storage/upload (object-key path traversal)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-57565</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; readest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Readest is a modern, feature-rich ebook reader designed for seamless cross-platform access and an intuitive reading experience. Prior to 0.11.10, the apps/readest-app/src/pages/api/storage/upload.ts route constructed an object key from the authenticated user&amp;#39;s identifier and a client-controlled fileName without rejecting path separators or parent-directory traversal. In the R2 backend, apps/readest-app/src/utils/r2.ts placed that key into a new Request URL before signing it, and URL normalization collapsed parent-directory components so the resulting presigned PUT could escape the caller&amp;#39;s namespace. An authenticated attacker who knew a target user identifier and book hash could overwrite or poison that user&amp;#39;s stored book object and corrupt the associated file_key metadata; the exact cross-tenant escape was verified for the R2 backend. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.10.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; readest&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Readest is a modern, feature-rich ebook reader designed for seamless cross-platform access and an intuitive reading experience. Prior to 0.11.10, the apps/readest-app/src/pages/api/storage/upload.ts route constructed an object key from the authenticated user&amp;#39;s identifier and a client-controlled fileName without rejecting path separators or parent-directory traversal. In the R2 backend, apps/readest-app/src/utils/r2.ts placed that key into a new Request URL before signing it, and URL normalization collapsed parent-directory components so the resulting presigned PUT could escape the caller&amp;#39;s namespace. An authenticated attacker who knew a target user identifier and book hash could overwrite or poison that user&amp;#39;s stored book object and corrupt the associated file_key metadata; the exact cross-tenant escape was verified for the R2 backend. This issue is fixed in version 0.11.10.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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