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      <title>CVE-2026-56722 — Dompdf: Local file read due to improper file path validation in SVG images encoded as data-URI</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-56722</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dompdf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. In versions 3.15 and prior, aAn attacker who controls the HTML input can bypass this restriction by embedding a target file path inside an SVG image delivered through a  data:  URI, because dompdf processes the SVG twice and the second pass does not enforce the same protections as the first. When rendering, dompdf hands the SVG to the separate  php-svg-lib  library with external references forced on, and that library has no knowledge of the chroot directory, blocks only the  phar://  scheme, and ultimately reads the referenced file with no path or protocol validation. This lets an external, unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary image files from the server&amp;#39;s file system in the default configuration. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; dompdf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Dompdf is an HTML to PDF converter for PHP. In versions 3.15 and prior, aAn attacker who controls the HTML input can bypass this restriction by embedding a target file path inside an SVG image delivered through a  data:  URI, because dompdf processes the SVG twice and the second pass does not enforce the same protections as the first. When rendering, dompdf hands the SVG to the separate  php-svg-lib  library with external references forced on, and that library has no knowledge of the chroot directory, blocks only the  phar://  scheme, and ultimately reads the referenced file with no path or protocol validation. This lets an external, unauthenticated attacker read arbitrary image files from the server&amp;#39;s file system in the default configuration. This issue has been fixed in version 3.16.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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