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      <title>CVE-2026-55176 — Soft Machine: Cross-tenant workspace API auth bypass via shared `CONTAINER_SHARED_SECRET` bearer token</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-55176</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Soft-Machine-io security&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine–based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, two authentication helpers in /app/server.js — verifyContainerAuth() and authenticateWorkspaceHttp() — accept the global CONTAINER_SHARED_SECRET as a bearer token without verifying which workspace the caller belongs to. Because that secret is set identically on every container in the Fly app and is reachable from the user-facing process environment inside each workspace, any tenant can use it to authenticate to any other tenant&amp;#39;s workspace API. The result is cross-workspace read, write, and destructive-restore primitives reachable from any paying customer&amp;#39;s shell. The existing per-workspace token check (workspaceTokenMatches) protects the user-facing per-workspace token path, but the shared-secret bearer path bypasses it entirely. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Soft-Machine-io security&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Soft Machine is a Virtual Machine–based agentic development environment / Cloud OS. In versions 0.2.247 and prior, two authentication helpers in /app/server.js — verifyContainerAuth() and authenticateWorkspaceHttp() — accept the global CONTAINER_SHARED_SECRET as a bearer token without verifying which workspace the caller belongs to. Because that secret is set identically on every container in the Fly app and is reachable from the user-facing process environment inside each workspace, any tenant can use it to authenticate to any other tenant&amp;#39;s workspace API. The result is cross-workspace read, write, and destructive-restore primitives reachable from any paying customer&amp;#39;s shell. The existing per-workspace token check (workspaceTokenMatches) protects the user-facing per-workspace token path, but the shared-secret bearer path bypasses it entirely. At time of publication, there are no publicly known patches.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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