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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 29 Sep 2026 17:15:57 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-19125 — EthPress &lt;= 2.3.5 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-19125</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lynn999 EthPress – Web3 Login&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The EthPress – Web3 Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.5. This is due to the verify_login() function in app/Login.php containing a missing return statement in the signature verification failure branch — when Signature::verify2() reports a mismatch, the function only assigns a WP_Error to a local variable and continues executing, causing unconditional fall-through to the login block where Address::log_in() calls wp_set_auth_cookie() regardless of whether the submitted signature is valid. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any WordPress user who has a linked wallet address — including administrators — by submitting that user&amp;#39;s public wallet address alongside an arbitrary well-formed signature, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; lynn999 EthPress – Web3 Login&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The EthPress – Web3 Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.5. This is due to the verify_login() function in app/Login.php containing a missing return statement in the signature verification failure branch — when Signature::verify2() reports a mismatch, the function only assigns a WP_Error to a local variable and continues executing, causing unconditional fall-through to the login block where Address::log_in() calls wp_set_auth_cookie() regardless of whether the submitted signature is valid. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in as any WordPress user who has a linked wallet address — including administrators — by submitting that user&amp;#39;s public wallet address alongside an arbitrary well-formed signature, enabling full site takeover.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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