https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 13 Nov 2026 23:24:17 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-16662 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mcu-tools mcuboot</p> <p>boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image&#39;s EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len &gt; sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record.</p> <p>The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when nothing has checked the length of the hash TLV before boot_save_boot_status() reads it. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr&#39;s CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. Two kinds of build let a short TLV through:</p> <p>Builds that use pure signatures (MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE_PURE). The signature covers the image itself, so the hash-TLV check in bootutil_img_validate() is compiled out, and a pure-signed image normally carries no hash TLV. A hash TLV is still allowed in the unprotected TLV area, which the signature does not cover, so a short one can be add…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> mcu-tools mcuboot</p> <p>boot_save_boot_status() in boot/bootutil/src/boot_record.c reads the image&#39;s EXPECTED_HASH_TLV into a stack buffer image_hash[IMAGE_HASH_SIZE] that is never zero-initialised. The TLV handler validates only the upper bound (len &gt; sizeof(image_hash)) and then reads exactly len bytes, so a TLV shorter than IMAGE_HASH_SIZE leaves the tail of image_hash holding stale stack content. The subsequent copy into the boot record, memcpy(buf + offset, image_hash, sizeof(image_hash)), uses the fixed buffer size rather than len, so up to IMAGE_HASH_SIZE - 1 bytes of uninitialised bootloader stack are written into the measured-boot record.</p> <p>The defect is reachable only under MCUBOOT_MEASURED_BOOT, and only when nothing has checked the length of the hash TLV before boot_save_boot_status() reads it. bootutil_img_validate() rejects a hash TLV whose length is not exactly sizeof(hash) (boot/bootutil/src/image_validate.c:345), and primary-slot validation is on by default (Zephyr&#39;s CONFIG_BOOT_VALIDATE_SLOT0 defaults to y), so in a default build the malformed image never reaches this code. Two kinds of build let a short TLV through:</p> <p>Builds that use pure signatures (MCUBOOT_SIGN_PURE, Zephyr CONFIG_BOOT_SIGNATURE_TYPE_PURE). The signature covers the image itself, so the hash-TLV check in bootutil_img_validate() is compiled out, and a pure-signed image normally carries no hash TLV. A hash TLV is still allowed in the unprotected TLV area, which the signature does not cover, so a short one can be add…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-16662