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      <title>CVE-2026-125331 — HarnessRouter: Service-only routes that write an organization's provider connections could be reached through a multi-t…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-125331</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; harnessrouter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HarnessRouter is a self-hosted unified API for running agent harnesses with sessions, streaming, files, cancellation, and failure handling. Prior to 0.31.8, a console that is not in self-hosted mode attaches the server&amp;#39;s internal key to requests carrying an Authorization header before validating the bearer, while the service-only PUT and GET /v1/orgs/{org}/connections/{name}, PUT /v1/orgs/{org}/policy/{backend}, and /internal/* routes trust that key and take the organization from the URL. In a multi-organization deployment, a remote caller can use a made-up bearer to rewrite another organization&amp;#39;s provider connection to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing later prompts to be disclosed and attacker-controlled responses to influence tasks. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.8.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; harnessrouter&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;HarnessRouter is a self-hosted unified API for running agent harnesses with sessions, streaming, files, cancellation, and failure handling. Prior to 0.31.8, a console that is not in self-hosted mode attaches the server&amp;#39;s internal key to requests carrying an Authorization header before validating the bearer, while the service-only PUT and GET /v1/orgs/{org}/connections/{name}, PUT /v1/orgs/{org}/policy/{backend}, and /internal/* routes trust that key and take the organization from the URL. In a multi-organization deployment, a remote caller can use a made-up bearer to rewrite another organization&amp;#39;s provider connection to an attacker-controlled endpoint, causing later prompts to be disclosed and attacker-controlled responses to influence tasks. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.8.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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