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      <title>CVE-2026-119631 — Kirki &lt;= 6.4.1 - Missing Authorization to Unauthenticated Sensitive User Data Exposure via Editor-Preview-Token on AJAX…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-119631</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; themeum Kirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder &amp;amp; Customizer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Kirki - Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder &amp;amp; Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthorized Data Access in versions up to, and including, 6.4.1 via the `kirki_post_apis` AJAX action&amp;#39;s `get-dynamic-content-batch` and `get-collection-batch` endpoints. This is due to the plugin opening these resolvers behind a site-wide, resource-unbound preview token (`EditorPreview::has_valid_token()`) that is NOT bound to the specific page the administrator intended to share, combined with the absence of any `list_users` or `can_user_read_post()` capability check inside `HelperFunctions::get_user_dynamic_content()` and `Collection::get_collection_batch()` — the equivalent checks ARE present on the plugin&amp;#39;s own REST route (`FrontendRESTController::get_item_permissions_check()`). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers holding any valid read-only share link to extract from the entire user table every user&amp;#39;s `user_email`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `nickname`, `registered_date`, arbitrary string-valued `user_meta` (including custom keys such as `billing_phone`), and the e-mail address of every approved commenter — information that WordPress itself withholds from anonymous readers (served only in the `edit` context behind `list_users`).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; themeum Kirki – Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder &amp;amp; Customizer&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Kirki - Freeform Page Builder, Website Builder &amp;amp; Customizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Unauthorized Data Access in versions up to, and including, 6.4.1 via the `kirki_post_apis` AJAX action&amp;#39;s `get-dynamic-content-batch` and `get-collection-batch` endpoints. This is due to the plugin opening these resolvers behind a site-wide, resource-unbound preview token (`EditorPreview::has_valid_token()`) that is NOT bound to the specific page the administrator intended to share, combined with the absence of any `list_users` or `can_user_read_post()` capability check inside `HelperFunctions::get_user_dynamic_content()` and `Collection::get_collection_batch()` — the equivalent checks ARE present on the plugin&amp;#39;s own REST route (`FrontendRESTController::get_item_permissions_check()`). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers holding any valid read-only share link to extract from the entire user table every user&amp;#39;s `user_email`, `first_name`, `last_name`, `nickname`, `registered_date`, arbitrary string-valued `user_meta` (including custom keys such as `billing_phone`), and the e-mail address of every approved commenter — information that WordPress itself withholds from anonymous readers (served only in the `edit` context behind `list_users`).&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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