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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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      <title>CVE-2026-119335 — Pi-hole: Local privilege escalation from `pihole` user to root via CVE-2026-41489  fix bypass</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-119335</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pi-hole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. Prior to 6.5, advanced/Scripts/utils.sh getFTLPID() attempts to validate the pihole-owned /run/pihole-FTL.pid file with expr &amp;#34;${FTL_PID}&amp;#34; : &amp;#34;[^[:digit:]]&amp;#34;, but this rejects only values whose first character is not a digit. An attacker with code execution as the pihole user can write a digit-prefixed arithmetic expression to the pihole-owned PID file. Root-run pihole subcommands then evaluate [[ &amp;#34;$pid&amp;#34; -eq &amp;#34;-1&amp;#34; ]], causing Bash to recursively evaluate array subscripts and execute command substitution as root. This bypasses the content-validation portion of the CVE-2026-41489 remediation while leaving its hardcoded PID-file path protection intact. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; pi-hole&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. Prior to 6.5, advanced/Scripts/utils.sh getFTLPID() attempts to validate the pihole-owned /run/pihole-FTL.pid file with expr &amp;#34;${FTL_PID}&amp;#34; : &amp;#34;[^[:digit:]]&amp;#34;, but this rejects only values whose first character is not a digit. An attacker with code execution as the pihole user can write a digit-prefixed arithmetic expression to the pihole-owned PID file. Root-run pihole subcommands then evaluate [[ &amp;#34;$pid&amp;#34; -eq &amp;#34;-1&amp;#34; ]], causing Bash to recursively evaluate array subscripts and execute command substitution as root. This bypasses the content-validation portion of the CVE-2026-41489 remediation while leaving its hardcoded PID-file path protection intact. This issue is fixed in version 6.5.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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