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      <title>CVE-2026-118265 — Echo: X-Real-IP extractor trusts the header value instead of the sending peer</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-118265</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; labstack echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; labstack echo&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Echo is a Go web framework. From 5.0.0 until 5.4.1, Echo v5&amp;#39;s ExtractIPFromRealIPHeader validates whether the client-supplied X-Real-IP value belongs to a trusted range instead of validating the direct network peer. A client reaching Echo directly, or through a proxy that preserves the header, can supply a loopback or private address and have Context.RealIP return that spoofed identity. Applications using the extractor for IP allowlists, rate limiting, audit logs, or forwarding headers can consequently trust an attacker-controlled address; the default direct extractor and Echo v4 are unaffected. This issue is fixed in 5.4.1.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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