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      <title>CVE-2026-116774 — russh: peer-declared zero maximum packet size permanently stalls channel writes (silent AsyncWrite hang)</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-116774</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.60.0 until 0.65.0, channel-open parsing accepts a peer-declared maximum_packet_size of zero and passes it into ChannelTx::poll_writable in russh/src/channels/io/tx.rs. The Channel::data, Channel::make_writer, and Channel::into_stream asynchronous write paths then calculate a writable size of zero and remain pending forever because window adjustments cannot satisfy a static zero packet maximum. An authenticated client can strand server writes, and a malicious server can strand client writes, allowing affected tasks, channels, and connections to accumulate without surfacing an error. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. From 0.60.0 until 0.65.0, channel-open parsing accepts a peer-declared maximum_packet_size of zero and passes it into ChannelTx::poll_writable in russh/src/channels/io/tx.rs. The Channel::data, Channel::make_writer, and Channel::into_stream asynchronous write paths then calculate a writable size of zero and remain pending forever because window adjustments cannot satisfy a static zero packet maximum. An authenticated client can strand server writes, and a malicious server can strand client writes, allowing affected tasks, channels, and connections to accumulate without surfacing an error. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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