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    <lastBuildDate>Thu, 05 Nov 2026 19:49:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-116773 — russh's SSH client is susceptible to unbounded allocations via EXT_INFO packets</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-116773</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, the client Session::process_packet path in russh/src/client/encrypted.rs accepts repeated packets encoded with russh&amp;#39;s private msg::EXT_INFO = 7 before authentication, while the standards-compliant EXT_INFO message number 82 does not reach the affected handler. The handle_ext_info function appends every parsed extension name to received_extensions without clearing, deduplicating, or bounding the vector. A malicious SSH server that deliberately sends private message number 7 can therefore retain an unbounded number of attacker-controlled extension names for the session lifetime, causing progressive client memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Eugeny russh&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;russh is a Rust SSH client and server library that includes an SSH agent protocol implementation. Prior to 0.65.0, the client Session::process_packet path in russh/src/client/encrypted.rs accepts repeated packets encoded with russh&amp;#39;s private msg::EXT_INFO = 7 before authentication, while the standards-compliant EXT_INFO message number 82 does not reach the affected handler. The handle_ext_info function appends every parsed extension name to received_extensions without clearing, deduplicating, or bounding the vector. A malicious SSH server that deliberately sends private message number 7 can therefore retain an unbounded number of attacker-controlled extension names for the session lifetime, causing progressive client memory exhaustion. This issue is fixed in version 0.65.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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