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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
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      <title>CVE-2026-115910 — Python Social Auth: OpenID Connect nonce is not bound to the browser session, so a stolen authorization code logs the a…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115910</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-social-auth social-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; python-social-auth social-core&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Python Social Auth is a social authentication and registration mechanism. Prior to 6.2.0, OpenIdConnectAuth in social_core/backends/open_id_connect.py uses get_and_store_nonce to place the OpenID Connect nonce in a shared OpenIdConnectAssociation table, and get_nonce and validate_claims verify only that the nonce exists and has not expired rather than binding it to the browser session and OAuth state that initiated the login. An attacker who obtains a victim&amp;#39;s unused authorization code can start a separate login to obtain valid state for the attacker&amp;#39;s browser, submit the victim&amp;#39;s code with that state, and pass nonce validation because the victim nonce is globally available. With DEFAULT_USE_PKCE disabled in the default OpenIdConnectAuth configuration, the attacker can be logged in as the victim. This issue is fixed in version 6.2.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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