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    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
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    <lastBuildDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2026 22:42:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-115693 — Custom cacerts or cacertfile do not restrict trust to the pinned CA in hackney</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-115693</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; benoitc hackney&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Certificate Validation vulnerability in hackney_ssl in benoitc hackney allows an on-path attacker to impersonate a server pinned to a private certificate authority via a certificate chain that ends in a publicly trusted root. hackney adds {partial_chain, fun hackney_ssl:partial_chain/1} to every verify_peer configuration. The callback returns any certificate in the peer chain whose public key matches a root in the bundled certifi store as the trust anchor, and OTP honours that callback over the configured cacerts. hackney_ssl:merge_ssl_opts/3 kept the callback when the caller replaced the trust store with cacerts or cacertfile in ssl_options, so a connection pinned to a private CA still accepted any chain that carried a publicly trusted root.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The hostname check still applies, so the attacker needs a publicly trusted certificate for the pinned hostname.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue affects hackney: from 1.24.0 before 4.9.0.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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