https://db.gcve.eu Contains only the most 10 recent entries. http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification python-feedgen en Fri, 23 Oct 2026 07:51:03 +0000 https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114611 <p><strong>Affected:</strong> schorschii OCO-Server</p> <p>OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device&#39;s serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device&#39;s freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=&lt;serial&gt;` issued by the server&#39;s internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim&#39;s `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial…</p> <p><strong>Affected:</strong> schorschii OCO-Server</p> <p>OCO-Server is a self-hosted endpoint management application for computer inventory, software deployment, and mobile device management. Prior to 1.2.3,the Apple MDM enrollment endpoint `frontend/api-mdm.php` verifies the signed enrollment-request plist with `openssl_pkcs7_verify(..., PKCS7_NOVERIFY, ...)`. `PKCS7_NOVERIFY` disables signer certificate chain and trust validation, so the signature only has to be self-consistent with whatever certificate is embedded in the PKCS#7 blob. A self-signed certificate from an unrelated attacker is accepted. Because the endpoint trusts the `SERIAL` field taken from the unverified payload, anyone who knows a registered device&#39;s serial number can sign a forged plist (`SERIAL` = victim device, attacker-chosen `UDID`) with an arbitrary self-signed certificate; POST it unauthenticated to `/api-mdm.php/profile` (Content-Type: `application/pkcs7-signature`); and receive the victim device&#39;s freshly minted MDM identity: a certificate with `CN=&lt;serial&gt;` issued by the server&#39;s internal MDM device CA, bundled with its private key in a PKCS#12 payload inside the returned `.mobileconfig` enrollment profile. Additionally, the victim&#39;s `mobile_device` database row is silently overwritten with the attacker-supplied `UDID` (device-record hijack). With the stolen certificate and key, the attacker can impersonate the victim device on all subsequent MDM traffic (`/checkin`, `/mdm`, `/parameters`), which authenticate callers by the certificate CN (the serial…</p> https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-114611