<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?>
<?xml-stylesheet href="/static/style.xsl" type="text/xsl"?>
<rss xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/" version="2.0">
  <channel>
    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
    <docs>http://www.rssboard.org/rss-specification</docs>
    <generator>python-feedgen</generator>
    <language>en</language>
    <lastBuildDate>Sun, 01 Nov 2026 22:52:18 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>CVE-2026-105454 — Stored XSS via crafted URLs in HTML ticket content in Request Tracker</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-105454</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Best Practical Solutions Request Tracker&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RT&amp;#39;s automatic link creation for URLs in HTML ticket content does
      not HTML-escape the URL it places in the link. A URL crafted to
      break out of the link&amp;#39;s address can add a script that runs when the
      ticket history is displayed, with no further action by the viewer.
      Anyone who can add HTML content to a ticket can plant it. That
      includes an unauthenticated sender of HTML email to any queue that
      grants CreateTicket or ReplyToTicket to Everyone, which is routine
      for a queue that accepts mail from the public. The script runs in
      the session of any user who views the ticket, and can act in RT
      with that user&amp;#39;s authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 5.0.11 and 6.0.4&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Best Practical Solutions Request Tracker&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;RT&amp;#39;s automatic link creation for URLs in HTML ticket content does
      not HTML-escape the URL it places in the link. A URL crafted to
      break out of the link&amp;#39;s address can add a script that runs when the
      ticket history is displayed, with no further action by the viewer.
      Anyone who can add HTML content to a ticket can plant it. That
      includes an unauthenticated sender of HTML email to any queue that
      grants CreateTicket or ReplyToTicket to Everyone, which is routine
      for a queue that accepts mail from the public. The script runs in
      the session of any user who views the ticket, and can act in RT
      with that user&amp;#39;s authority.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This issue was fixed in version 5.0.11 and 6.0.4&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-105454</guid>
    </item>
  </channel>
</rss>
