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      <title>CVE-2026-104016 — jackson-dataformat-protobuf: signed integer overflow in string-length paths allows unbounded array allocation and OutOf…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-104016</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FasterXML jackson-dataformat-protobuf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) &amp;lt;= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; FasterXML jackson-dataformat-protobuf&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ProtobufParser parses length-prefixed protobuf string and bytes fields by checking (_inputPtr + len) &amp;lt;= _inputEnd and then, on the fast path, calling _finishShortText(len). Both use 32-bit signed integer arithmetic. When an attacker supplies a varint decoding to a length near Integer.MAX_VALUE, _inputPtr + len overflows to a negative value, the bounds check passes, and _finishShortText(len) reaches TextBuffer.expandCurrentSegment(len), which performs Arrays.copyOf with no cap and throws OutOfMemoryError: Requested array size exceeds VM limit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The JVM refuses arrays larger than Integer.MAX_VALUE - 8 before consulting available heap, so -Xmx tuning does not mitigate the issue. StreamReadConstraints.maxStringLength and maxDocumentLength do not gate this path: a 33-byte payload is far below any document-length cap and the string-length check does not fire before the allocation. This was confirmed empirically against shipping artifacts with maxStringLength, maxDocumentLength and maxNestingDepth all configured.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A February 2026 hardening commit added the equivalent overflow guard to the packed-array-length and message-length paths but left the string-length call sites unguarded. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-104016</guid>
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