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      <title>CVE-2026-100619 — Capgo OTA Manifest Poisoning via app_versions.manifest Bypass</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100619</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Cap-go capgo.app&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is &amp;#39;r2-direct&amp;#39;, which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Cap-go capgo.app&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is &amp;#39;r2-direct&amp;#39;, which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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