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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 06 Nov 2026 12:45:29 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>CVE-2026-100252 — Apache ZooKeeper: SASL authorization bypass on the client port through a client-supplied authorization ID</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/cve-2026-100252</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache ZooKeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Authorization vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When SASL authentication is enabled on the client port, the server&amp;#39;s SASL callback handler grants every authorization identity (authzid) that a client requests, without checking it against the principal the client authenticated as. The server then tries to replace the requested identity with a canonical form of the authenticated principal, derived from the zookeeper.security.auth_to_local rules. If no rule applies to the principal, canonicalization fails and the error is only logged. The client-requested authzid then becomes the session&amp;#39;s SASL identity for all ACL checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated client whose principal is not covered by the auth_to_local rules can therefore claim any SASL identity. With the default rules, this includes any Kerberos principal from a realm other than the server&amp;#39;s default realm, such as a principal from a cross-realm trusted realm. The client then gets the permissions granted to that identity in sasl ACLs. If the requested identity matches a configured zookeeper.superUser, it gets superuser access to the whole data tree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.8 or 3.9.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Apache Software Foundation Apache ZooKeeper&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Improper Authorization vulnerability in Apache ZooKeeper.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When SASL authentication is enabled on the client port, the server&amp;#39;s SASL callback handler grants every authorization identity (authzid) that a client requests, without checking it against the principal the client authenticated as. The server then tries to replace the requested identity with a canonical form of the authenticated principal, derived from the zookeeper.security.auth_to_local rules. If no rule applies to the principal, canonicalization fails and the error is only logged. The client-requested authzid then becomes the session&amp;#39;s SASL identity for all ACL checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An authenticated client whose principal is not covered by the auth_to_local rules can therefore claim any SASL identity. With the default rules, this includes any Kerberos principal from a realm other than the server&amp;#39;s default realm, such as a principal from a cross-realm trusted realm. The client then gets the permissions granted to that identity in sasl ACLs. If the requested identity matches a configured zookeeper.superUser, it gets superuser access to the whole data tree.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Users are recommended to upgrade to version 3.8.8 or 3.9.7, which fixes the issue.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
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