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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:41:55 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99800</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99800</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring: free the task context after a grace period&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;percpu_counter_sub(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx-&amp;gt;task);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring: free the task context after a grace period&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;percpu_counter_sub(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx-&amp;gt;task);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99800</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-34fx-8j9p-c5p7</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-34fx-8j9p-c5p7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring: free the task context after a grace period&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;percpu_counter_sub(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx-&amp;gt;task);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring: free the task context after a grace period&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;percpu_counter_sub(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&amp;amp;tctx-&amp;gt;wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx-&amp;gt;task);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-34fx-8j9p-c5p7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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