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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:41:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99796</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99796</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()
until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per
call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled
request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks
past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits
about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,
0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup
watchdog fires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
  RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0
   io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170
   io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0
   __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does
for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.
__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request
that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead
of stopping at the match.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()
until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per
call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled
request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks
past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits
about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,
0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup
watchdog fires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
  RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0
   io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170
   io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0
   __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does
for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.
__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request
that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead
of stopping at the match.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99796</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-j264-pfcp-hf7w</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j264-pfcp-hf7w</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()
until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per
call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled
request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks
past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits
about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,
0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup
watchdog fires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
  RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0
   io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170
   io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0
   __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does
for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.
__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request
that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead
of stopping at the match.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;io_uring/poll: cancel all matching requests in one pass&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With IORING_ASYNC_CANCEL_ALL, __io_async_cancel() calls io_try_cancel()
until nothing is found, and io_poll_cancel() cancels one request per
call, starting each lookup at the beginning of the hash. A cancelled
request stays hashed until its task work runs, so every lookup walks
past the ones already cancelled. Cancelling K of N pending polls visits
about K*N/2 requests in one io_uring_enter(), with uring_lock held.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A single CANCEL_FD|ALL on 80000 polls on one eventfd takes 17.06s,
0.02s with this change. With voluntary preemption the soft lockup
watchdog fires:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 26s! [repro:100]
  RIP: 0010:io_cancel_req_match+0x19/0xa0
   io_poll_cancel+0x73/0x170
   io_try_cancel+0x7b/0xf0
   __io_async_cancel+0x41/0x110&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Walk the hash once and cancel every match, as io_cancel_remove() does
for futex and waitid. Cancel by user_data only needs its own bucket.
__io_async_cancel() still loops until nothing is found, so a request
that io-wq parks in the poll hash meanwhile is still cancelled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A cancel that matches one request now walks the whole hash twice instead
of stopping at the match.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-j264-pfcp-hf7w</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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