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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 20:42:09 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99777</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99777</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs-&amp;gt;in_req-&amp;gt;context to point at the
struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites
this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and
usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so
in_req-&amp;gt;context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has
actually been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget
disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs
before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel
value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct
p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req-&amp;gt;t_err = -ECONNRESET) and
hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req-&amp;gt;wq and req-&amp;gt;refcount
at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or
panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has
been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable
disconnect racing the very first request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs-&amp;gt;out_req-&amp;gt;context is set the same way but is never read by
this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via
ep-&amp;gt;driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both endpoints&amp;#39; -&amp;gt;driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in
enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use
to reco…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs-&amp;gt;in_req-&amp;gt;context to point at the
struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites
this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and
usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so
in_req-&amp;gt;context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has
actually been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget
disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs
before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel
value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct
p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req-&amp;gt;t_err = -ECONNRESET) and
hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req-&amp;gt;wq and req-&amp;gt;refcount
at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or
panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has
been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable
disconnect racing the very first request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs-&amp;gt;out_req-&amp;gt;context is set the same way but is never read by
this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via
ep-&amp;gt;driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both endpoints&amp;#39; -&amp;gt;driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in
enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use
to reco…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99777</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-pfg5-rwqf-43g3</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pfg5-rwqf-43g3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs-&amp;gt;in_req-&amp;gt;context to point at the
struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites
this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and
usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so
in_req-&amp;gt;context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has
actually been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget
disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs
before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel
value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct
p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req-&amp;gt;t_err = -ECONNRESET) and
hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req-&amp;gt;wq and req-&amp;gt;refcount
at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or
panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has
been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable
disconnect racing the very first request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs-&amp;gt;out_req-&amp;gt;context is set the same way but is never read by
this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via
ep-&amp;gt;driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both endpoints&amp;#39; -&amp;gt;driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in
enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use
to reco…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;net/9p/usbg: remove bogus context initialization in alloc_requests&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;alloc_requests() initializes usb9pfs-&amp;gt;in_req-&amp;gt;context to point at the
struct f_usb9pfs instance itself. usb9pfs_queue_tx() later overwrites
this with the real struct p9_req_t pointer before every transmit, and
usb9pfs_tx_complete() clears it back to NULL after each completion, so
in_req-&amp;gt;context only ever holds a valid p9_req_t once a request has
actually been queued.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs_clear_tx(), however, can run at any time (mount close, gadget
disable) independent of whether a request was ever queued. If it runs
before the first usb9pfs_transmit(), it reads the leftover sentinel
value, type-confuses the struct f_usb9pfs pointer as a struct
p9_req_t, and both writes through it (req-&amp;gt;t_err = -ECONNRESET) and
hands it to p9_client_cb(), which manipulates req-&amp;gt;wq and req-&amp;gt;refcount
at bogus offsets inside f_usb9pfs. This reliably corrupts memory or
panics whenever the transport is torn down before any 9p request has
been transmitted, e.g. mounting and immediately unmounting, or a cable
disconnect racing the very first request.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;usb9pfs-&amp;gt;out_req-&amp;gt;context is set the same way but is never read by
this transport (usb9pfs_rx_complete() identifies the instance via
ep-&amp;gt;driver_data instead), so it serves no purpose either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Both endpoints&amp;#39; -&amp;gt;driver_data are already set to usb9pfs in
enable_endpoint(), which is what the completion handlers actually use
to reco…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-pfg5-rwqf-43g3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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