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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:30:25 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99751</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99751</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header &amp;lt; network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;after vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-&amp;gt;len &amp;lt; skb-&amp;gt;data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -&amp;gt; packet_xmit -&amp;gt; packet_sendmsg
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb-&amp;gt;tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h-&amp;gt;protocol, ip4h-&amp;gt;saddr and ip4h-&amp;gt;daddr past the linear
area.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb-&amp;gt;mac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
pack…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header &amp;lt; network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;after vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-&amp;gt;len &amp;lt; skb-&amp;gt;data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -&amp;gt; packet_xmit -&amp;gt; packet_sendmsg
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb-&amp;gt;tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h-&amp;gt;protocol, ip4h-&amp;gt;saddr and ip4h-&amp;gt;daddr past the linear
area.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb-&amp;gt;mac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
pack…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99751</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cfq2-9x4r-2cfp</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cfq2-9x4r-2cfp</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header &amp;lt; network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;after vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-&amp;gt;len &amp;lt; skb-&amp;gt;data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -&amp;gt; packet_xmit -&amp;gt; packet_sendmsg
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb-&amp;gt;tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h-&amp;gt;protocol, ip4h-&amp;gt;saddr and ip4h-&amp;gt;daddr past the linear
area.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb-&amp;gt;mac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
pack…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf: Fix skb_pull() BUG in __bpf_redirect_neigh()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The issue:
This is a follow-up to the short link-layer header fixes from Eric.
After vlan pop_eth, a privileged SCHED_ACT BPF program can call
bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0) and then bpf_redirect_neigh().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;__bpf_redirect_neigh() calls skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*ethh)) after checking
only that mac_header &amp;lt; network_header.  Nothing verifies that the MAC
header is long enough, that it is linear, or that the IP header the
redirect goes on to read is linear either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;A SCHED_ACT BPF program can do:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;bpf_skb_change_head(skb, 1, 0);
    bpf_redirect_neigh(lo, NULL, 0, 0);&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;after vlan pop_eth.  The skb then has mac_len == 1 and only one byte of
linear data; skb_pull(ETH_HLEN) trips the skb-&amp;gt;len &amp;lt; skb-&amp;gt;data_len BUG in
__skb_pull():&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2839!
    RIP: skb_pull+0x40/0x50
    Call Trace: skb_do_redirect -&amp;gt; packet_xmit -&amp;gt; packet_sendmsg
    Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The v4 and v6 paths read ip_hdr() and ipv6_hdr() as soon as the MAC
header is gone.  On the AF_PACKET frame below that leaves headlen == 0
after the pull, so the network header sits at skb-&amp;gt;tail and the route
lookup reads ip4h-&amp;gt;protocol, ip4h-&amp;gt;saddr and ip4h-&amp;gt;daddr past the linear
area.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Fix:
Use skb_network_offset(), which is the MAC header span, instead of
skb-&amp;gt;mac_len.  mac_len is zero for locally generated tc egress and netkit
pack…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cfq2-9x4r-2cfp</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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