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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:30:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99733</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99733</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to
the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption
that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may
have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at
that index.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However,
collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the
i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for
users which repeat the lookup when they find folio-&amp;gt;mapping changed.
The following scenario is, however, possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT)               CPU1 collapse_file()
  kiocb_invalidate_pages()
                                      read the folio (old data), lock it
                                      refcount check
  the write completes                 copy to new_folio
  kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write()
    find_get_entries() -&amp;gt; old folio
                                      xas_store(new_folio)
                                      folio-&amp;gt;mapping = NULL
                                      folio_unlock(folio)
    folio_lock()
    folio-&amp;gt;mapping != mapping
      -&amp;gt; continue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write
stays in the page cache after the write has returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This used to be impossible, as kh…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to
the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption
that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may
have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at
that index.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However,
collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the
i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for
users which repeat the lookup when they find folio-&amp;gt;mapping changed.
The following scenario is, however, possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT)               CPU1 collapse_file()
  kiocb_invalidate_pages()
                                      read the folio (old data), lock it
                                      refcount check
  the write completes                 copy to new_folio
  kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write()
    find_get_entries() -&amp;gt; old folio
                                      xas_store(new_folio)
                                      folio-&amp;gt;mapping = NULL
                                      folio_unlock(folio)
    folio_lock()
    folio-&amp;gt;mapping != mapping
      -&amp;gt; continue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write
stays in the page cache after the write has returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This used to be impossible, as kh…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99733</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-33fj-r5rr-5c6m</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-33fj-r5rr-5c6m</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to
the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption
that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may
have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at
that index.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However,
collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the
i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for
users which repeat the lookup when they find folio-&amp;gt;mapping changed.
The following scenario is, however, possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT)               CPU1 collapse_file()
  kiocb_invalidate_pages()
                                      read the folio (old data), lock it
                                      refcount check
  the write completes                 copy to new_folio
  kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write()
    find_get_entries() -&amp;gt; old folio
                                      xas_store(new_folio)
                                      folio-&amp;gt;mapping = NULL
                                      folio_unlock(folio)
    folio_lock()
    folio-&amp;gt;mapping != mapping
      -&amp;gt; continue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write
stays in the page cache after the write has returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This used to be impossible, as kh…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm/truncate: look again if a folio left the mapping&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;invalidate_inode_pages2_range() skips a folio which no longer belongs to
the mapping by the time it has got the folio lock, on the assumption
that somebody else has removed it from the page cache. But the folio may
have been replaced, and then there is a new folio with the same data at
that index.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For most cases, like folio migration, that is impossible. However,
collapse_file() only checks the refcount of the old folios, under the
i_pages lock, and relies on their folio locks from there on. That works for
users which repeat the lookup when they find folio-&amp;gt;mapping changed.
The following scenario is, however, possible:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;CPU0 pwrite(O_DIRECT)               CPU1 collapse_file()
  kiocb_invalidate_pages()
                                      read the folio (old data), lock it
                                      refcount check
  the write completes                 copy to new_folio
  kiocb_invalidate_post_direct_write()
    find_get_entries() -&amp;gt; old folio
                                      xas_store(new_folio)
                                      folio-&amp;gt;mapping = NULL
                                      folio_unlock(folio)
    folio_lock()
    folio-&amp;gt;mapping != mapping
      -&amp;gt; continue&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In that scenario, the collapsed folio with the data from before the write
stays in the page cache after the write has returned.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This used to be impossible, as kh…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-33fj-r5rr-5c6m</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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