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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:30:48 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99561</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99561</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fork: don&amp;#39;t create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can&amp;#39;t
catch it anymore. It isn&amp;#39;t counted in core_state-&amp;gt;threads_remaining and
it isn&amp;#39;t sent SIGKILL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls
io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task
work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates
a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in
the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being
dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it
exits it sees signal-&amp;gt;core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and
decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves
coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately
didn&amp;#39;t send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn&amp;#39;t
have PF_SIGNALED either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.
That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever
gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn&amp;#39;t retry -EINTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clearing PF_P…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fork: don&amp;#39;t create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can&amp;#39;t
catch it anymore. It isn&amp;#39;t counted in core_state-&amp;gt;threads_remaining and
it isn&amp;#39;t sent SIGKILL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls
io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task
work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates
a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in
the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being
dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it
exits it sees signal-&amp;gt;core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and
decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves
coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately
didn&amp;#39;t send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn&amp;#39;t
have PF_SIGNALED either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.
That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever
gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn&amp;#39;t retry -EINTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clearing PF_P…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99561</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-7qq5-73rh-j698</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-7qq5-73rh-j698</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fork: don&amp;#39;t create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can&amp;#39;t
catch it anymore. It isn&amp;#39;t counted in core_state-&amp;gt;threads_remaining and
it isn&amp;#39;t sent SIGKILL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls
io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task
work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates
a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in
the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being
dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it
exits it sees signal-&amp;gt;core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and
decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves
coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately
didn&amp;#39;t send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn&amp;#39;t
have PF_SIGNALED either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.
That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever
gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn&amp;#39;t retry -EINTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clearing PF_P…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;fork: don&amp;#39;t create io threads once PF_POSTCOREDUMP is set&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;zap_process() skips every thread that already has PF_POSTCOREDUMP set.
Such a thread is past synchronize_group_exit(), so a coredump can&amp;#39;t
catch it anymore. It isn&amp;#39;t counted in core_state-&amp;gt;threads_remaining and
it isn&amp;#39;t sent SIGKILL.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;do_exit() sets PF_POSTCOREDUMP in synchronize_group_exit() and calls
io_uring_files_cancel() right after that. The cancellation runs task
work and a create_worker_cb() that io-wq queued before the exit creates
a new io-wq worker from there. If another thread started a coredump in
the meantime that worker joins a thread-group which is already being
dumped. zap_process() never saw it so it was never counted. But when it
exits it sees signal-&amp;gt;core_state in synchronize_group_exit() and
decrements threads_remaining like any other thread.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So the count reaches zero one thread early and the dumper leaves
coredump_wait_inactive() while a thread it counted is still running.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The task has no fatal signal pending because zap_process() deliberately
didn&amp;#39;t send it one, and it never went through get_signal() so it doesn&amp;#39;t
have PF_SIGNALED either.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Refuse to create an io thread when the creator has PF_POSTCOREDUMP.
That costs nothing. io_uring_files_cancel() raises IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT
before it runs any task work, so a worker created from there only ever
gets to exit again, and io_should_retry_thread() doesn&amp;#39;t retry -EINTR.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Clearing PF_P…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-7qq5-73rh-j698</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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