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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:31:00 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99530</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99530</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target
threadgroup&amp;#39;s cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds
the forking threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading. These are different
semaphores when fork creates a new process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy_process() publishes the child&amp;#39;s PID before cgroup_post_fork() links
the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,
take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child-&amp;gt;cgroups still
points to init_css_set and child-&amp;gt;cg_list is empty. Migration links the
node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same
node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both
task lists and their css_set ownership.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523
(&amp;#34;cgroups: add lock for child-&amp;gt;cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()&amp;#34;) and
restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock
protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup
locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration
side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process
exclusion failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Take the new threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading before the child becomes
visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass
because fork already holds the parent&amp;#39;s semap…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target
threadgroup&amp;#39;s cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds
the forking threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading. These are different
semaphores when fork creates a new process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy_process() publishes the child&amp;#39;s PID before cgroup_post_fork() links
the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,
take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child-&amp;gt;cgroups still
points to init_css_set and child-&amp;gt;cg_list is empty. Migration links the
node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same
node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both
task lists and their css_set ownership.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523
(&amp;#34;cgroups: add lock for child-&amp;gt;cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()&amp;#34;) and
restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock
protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup
locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration
side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process
exclusion failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Take the new threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading before the child becomes
visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass
because fork already holds the parent&amp;#39;s semap…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99530</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-79vx-v9mv-wvff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-79vx-v9mv-wvff</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target
threadgroup&amp;#39;s cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds
the forking threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading. These are different
semaphores when fork creates a new process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy_process() publishes the child&amp;#39;s PID before cgroup_post_fork() links
the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,
take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child-&amp;gt;cgroups still
points to init_css_set and child-&amp;gt;cg_list is empty. Migration links the
node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same
node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both
task lists and their css_set ownership.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523
(&amp;#34;cgroups: add lock for child-&amp;gt;cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()&amp;#34;) and
restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock
protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup
locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration
side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process
exclusion failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Take the new threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading before the child becomes
visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass
because fork already holds the parent&amp;#39;s semap…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;cgroup: serialize migrations of newly forked processes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;With favordynmods enabled, a cgroup.procs migration takes the target
threadgroup&amp;#39;s cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem for writing. A process fork holds
the forking threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading. These are different
semaphores when fork creates a new process.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;copy_process() publishes the child&amp;#39;s PID before cgroup_post_fork() links
the child to its css_set. A writer can find the child in that interval,
take its uncontended semaphore, and migrate it while child-&amp;gt;cgroups still
points to init_css_set and child-&amp;gt;cg_list is empty. Migration links the
node into init_css_set.mg_tasks. cgroup_post_fork() then adds the same
node to the intended css_set as though it were unlinked, corrupting both
task lists and their css_set ownership.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This regresses the fork/migration race fixed by commit b12b533fa523
(&amp;#34;cgroups: add lock for child-&amp;gt;cgroups in cgroup_post_fork()&amp;#34;) and
restored again in 2012 after the lock had been removed. The old task_lock
protection was later superseded by global css_set and cgroup threadgroup
locking. The change identified by the Fixes tag narrowed only the migration
side back to a per-threadgroup lock, recreating the different-process
exclusion failure.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Take the new threadgroup&amp;#39;s semaphore for reading before the child becomes
visible and hold it through cgroup_post_fork(). Use a nested lock subclass
because fork already holds the parent&amp;#39;s semap…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-79vx-v9mv-wvff</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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