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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:30:31 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99503</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99503</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host)
	{
		struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host-&amp;gt;private_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iounmap(host_priv-&amp;gt;hcr_base);
		kfree(host_priv);
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt;host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop()
devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when
the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been
started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base
and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two
device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been
activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed
host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has
been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and
host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as
that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host)
	{
		struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host-&amp;gt;private_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iounmap(host_priv-&amp;gt;hcr_base);
		kfree(host_priv);
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt;host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop()
devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when
the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been
started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base
and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two
device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been
activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed
host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has
been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and
host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as
that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99503</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-cx5f-f8w9-p3p7</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cx5f-f8w9-p3p7</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host)
	{
		struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host-&amp;gt;private_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iounmap(host_priv-&amp;gt;hcr_base);
		kfree(host_priv);
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt;host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop()
devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when
the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been
started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base
and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two
device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been
activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed
host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has
been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and
host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as
that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;ata: sata_fsl: Fix use-after-free of host_priv on probe() failure&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;sata_fsl_host_stop() releases hcr_base and host_priv:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;static void sata_fsl_host_stop(struct ata_host *host)
	{
		struct sata_fsl_host_priv *host_priv = host-&amp;gt;private_data;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;iounmap(host_priv-&amp;gt;hcr_base);
		kfree(host_priv);
	}&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;-&amp;gt;host_stop() is called by the driver core through the ata_host_stop()
devres action which ata_host_start() registers, so it is called both when
the device is unbound and when probe() fails after the host has been
started.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The error_exit_with_cleanup label of sata_fsl_probe() releases hcr_base
and host_priv as well, and it is reachable from the two
device_create_file() calls which are done after the host has been
activated. In that case sata_fsl_host_stop() runs on an already freed
host_priv, resulting in a use-after-free and a double iounmap()/kfree().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Add a separate error label for the failures happening after the host has
been activated, which only detaches the host and leaves hcr_base and
host_priv to sata_fsl_host_stop().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Note that ata_host_detach() is dropped from error_exit_with_cleanup, as
that label is now only reachable while host is still NULL.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-cx5f-f8w9-p3p7</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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