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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:30:26 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99461</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99461</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF&amp;#34;, v5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry.  On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 3):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn().  On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn.  On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page-&amp;gt;flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last refere…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF&amp;#34;, v5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry.  On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 3):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn().  On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn.  On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page-&amp;gt;flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last refere…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99461</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-2m22-xjj2-6cjx</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2m22-xjj2-6cjx</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF&amp;#34;, v5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry.  On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 3):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn().  On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn.  On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page-&amp;gt;flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last refere…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Patch series &amp;#34;mm: khugepaged: fix tracepoint UAF&amp;#34;, v5.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The khugepaged tracepoints take a folio pointer and call folio_pfn(), but
by then the folio may no longer be valid: freed after folio_put(),
folio_unlock() or pte_unmap_unlock(), or not a folio at all but an
xarray-encoded swap entry.  On classic SPARSEMEM, dereferencing it oopses
khugepaged as soon as the trace event is enabled; on other memory models
it merely prints a bogus pfn.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Pass the pfn to the tracepoints directly, captured while the folio is
still pinned, closing the use-after-free windows in
mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), mm_khugepaged_scan_pmd() and
mm_khugepaged_collapse_file().&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This patch (of 3):&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;When the swap entries found exceed max_ptes_swap, the loop is left via
break with folio still holding the xarray value that encodes the swap
entry, not valid folio pointer.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;That value is passed to trace_mm_khugepaged_scan_file(), which feeds it to
folio_pfn().  On FLATMEM and SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP, the page_to_pfn() is plain
pointer arithmetic, so the trace event merely prints bogus scan_pfn.  On
classic SPARSEMEM, the page_to_pfn() reads page-&amp;gt;flags, dereferencing the
tiny encoded integer and oopsing khugepaged whenever the trace event is
enabled.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;So when folio is the swap entry value, simply set pfn to -1, just like
exhausted scan naturally.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;And the folio_put() has maybe dropped the last refere…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-2m22-xjj2-6cjx</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99461 — mm: khugepaged: fix swap entry value to folio_pfn()</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99461</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99461</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99461</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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