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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Fri, 20 Nov 2026 21:27:43 +0000</lastBuildDate>
    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99454</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99454</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99454</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-8gvv-m75j-pq7x</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8gvv-m75j-pq7x</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The RX software decrypt path mishandles crafted protected frames from a
malicious AP in two ways:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;1) decryptor() never checks that a protected frame is long enough to
hold the 802.11 header plus the per-cipher trailer.  All of
rtw_wep_decrypt(), rtw_tkip_decrypt() and rtw_aes_decrypt() compute&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;length = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;and act on the result, and recvframe_chkmic() similarly computes&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;datalen = hdr.len - hdrlen - iv_len - icv_len - 8;&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;for TKIP (the 8-byte Michael MIC is not accounted for in icv_len).
A frame shorter than hdrlen + iv_len + icv_len (+ 8 for TKIP) underflows
these unsigned subtractions, turning into a ~4 GiB iteration count in
aes_decipher()/arc4_crypt()/rtw_seccalctkipmic() or a ~4 GiB crc32_le()
length, causing out-of-bounds reads/writes of up to ~4 GiB starting from
the rx skb.  Reject such frames in decryptor() before touching the IV;
this covers all three ciphers and the TKIP MIC check, and also keeps the
unconditional iv[3] access within the frame.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;2) validate_80211w_mgmt() keeps using the frame - two memcpys through
the stale rx_data pointer and a pkt_len update - before checking
whether decryptor() returned NULL.  On decrypt failure (e.g. a unicast
protected deauth/disassoc/action frame with a bad MIC, which this path
always software-decrypts) the skb has already been freed, so this is a
use-after-fr…&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-8gvv-m75j-pq7x</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99454 — staging: rtl8723bs: fix protected RX frame validation in decrypt path</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99454</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99454</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99454</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>WID-SEC-W-2026-4695 — Linux Kernel: Mehrere Schwachstellen ermöglichen nicht spezifizierten Angriff</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Ein Angreifer kann mehrere Schwachstellen im Linux Kernel ausnutzen, um einen nicht näher spezifizierten Angriff durchzuführen, möglicherweise einen Denial-of-Service-Angriff auszulösen, Daten zu manipulieren oder offenzulegen oder Sicherheitsmaßnahmen zu umgehen&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/wid-sec-w-2026-4695</guid>
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