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    <title>Most recent entries from all</title>
    <link>https://db.gcve.eu</link>
    <description>Contains only the most 10 recent entries.</description>
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    <lastBuildDate>Sat, 07 Nov 2026 04:23:49 +0000</lastBuildDate>
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      <title>certfr-2026-avi-1470 — De multiples vulnérabilités ont été découvertes dans le noyau Linux de SUSE. Certaines d'entre elles permettent à un at…</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1470</link>
      <description>certfr-2026-avi-1470</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/certfr-2026-avi-1470</guid>
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    <item>
      <title>fkie_cve-2026-99131</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99131</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: fix capability check in xfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota
by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user
belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials
has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
bypassing quota accounting checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
selinux audit messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: fix capability check in xfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota
by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user
belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials
has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
bypassing quota accounting checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
selinux audit messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/fkie_cve-2026-99131</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>GHSA-5g3h-v4h7-rrh3</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5g3h-v4h7-rrh3</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: fix capability check in xfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota
by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user
belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials
has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
bypassing quota accounting checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
selinux audit messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;xfs: fix capability check in xfs&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota
by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user
belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the
file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a
has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages.
Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though
their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell:&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials
has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like
changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client
this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively
bypassing quota accounting checks.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent
selinux audit messages.&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ghsa-5g3h-v4h7-rrh3</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>msrc_CVE-2026-99131 — xfs: fix capability check in xfs</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99131</link>
      <description>msrc_CVE-2026-99131</description>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/msrc_cve-2026-99131</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>SUSE-SU-2026:24550-1 — Security update for the Linux Kernel</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2026:24550-1</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;Security update for the Linux Kernel&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/suse-su-2026:24550-1</guid>
    </item>
    <item>
      <title>UBUNTU-CVE-2026-99131</title>
      <link>https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99131</link>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 155 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix capability check in xfs An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit. Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages. Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell: capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively bypassing quota accounting checks. Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent selinux audit messages. This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</description>
      <content:encoded>&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Affected:&lt;/strong&gt; Ubuntu:16.04:LTS: linux-hwe-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.0, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-aws-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-azure-edge, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gcp-5.3, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-4.15, Ubuntu:18.04:LTS: linux-gke-5.4 and 155 more&lt;/p&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix capability check in xfs An user reported a bug where he managed to evade group&amp;#39;s quota by changing a file&amp;#39;s gid to a different group id the same user belonged to, even though quotas were enforced on both gids and the file&amp;#39;s size was big enough to exceed the quota&amp;#39;s hardlimit. Commit eba0549bc7d1 replaced a capable() call by a has_capability_noaudit() to prevent unnecessary selinux audit messages. Turns out that both calls have slightly different semantics even though their documentation seems similar. Where in a nutshell: capable() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s effective credentials has_ns_capability_noaudit() - Tests the task&amp;#39;s real credentials This most of the time has no practical difference but in some cases like changing attrs (specifically group id in this case) through a NFS client this will allow the quota code to use XFS_QMOPT_FORCE_RES, effectively bypassing quota accounting checks. Using instead ns_capable_noaudit() should fix this issue and prevent selinux audit messages. This also fix the remaining calls to has_capability_noaudit()&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
      <guid isPermaLink="false">https://db.gcve.eu/vuln/ubuntu-cve-2026-99131</guid>
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